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The Equal Protection Doctrine in the
Age of Trump
THE EXAMPLE OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT
CHILDREN
Rebecca A. Delfino†
INTRODUCTION
Nearly a century ago, Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. described an equal protection claim as “the
usual last resort of constitutional arguments.”1 Not anymore. In
the last forty years, the “equal protection doctrine has become
the Court’s chief instrument for invalidating . . . laws.”2 Now
dawns a new era—the age of Trump—when the equal protection
doctrine has greater significance, a broader application, and
renewed utility to invalidate federal laws and executive actions
that deny due process or discriminate.
President Trump has made no secret of his desire to
unwind policies of the prior administration in the areas of civil
rights, voting rights, immigration, environmental protection,
international relations, and health care.3 By the end of his first
year in office, “approximately [thirty] major federal lawsuits were
filed against the president and his administration challenging

† Clinical Professor of Law at Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I am grateful
to my colleagues for their helpful comments, particularly Sande Buhai and Justin Levitt.
I am also indebted to Nicholas Armer, Galen Bean, Chris Khasho and Gabrille Trujillo
for their research assistance, Loyola Law School for its generous support of faculty
scholarship, and as always, my family for their patience, indulgence and encouragement.
This article is dedicated to the hundreds of thousands of immigrant children who have
come to the United States alone without parents seeking a better life, including my late
great-grandfather Giovanni Jelmini, Sr. who came to the United States alone as a
teenager in 1911.
1 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
2 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
3 See David Smith, The Anti-Obama: Trump’s Drive to Destroy His Predecessor’s
Legacy, GUARDIAN, (May 11, 2018, 7:59 AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/may/11/donald-trump-barack-obama-legacy [https://perma.cc/YP77-C43Q];
Donald Trump: Year One, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/
executive-branch/donald-trump-year-one [https://perma.cc/6SBT-6C3S].
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[his executive orders or executive branch actions].”4 Specifically,
equal protection claims appear in recent challenges to the
executive branch’s actions related to the travel ban,5 transgender
members of the military,6 the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals program,7 efforts to eliminate benefits under the
Affordable Care Act,8 and the “zero tolerance”9 immigration
4 See Norman Siegel, 2017: The Constitution, Federal Courts and President
Trump, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 9, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites/
newyorklawjournal/2018/01/09/2017-the-constitution-federal-courts-and-president-trump/
[https://perma.cc/7TEY-CK3L].
5 President Trump’s initial immigration order banned travel and refugee
admission from seven predominantly Muslim countries. See Exec. Order No. 13, 780, 82
Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). Opponents of the ban claimed it violated equal
protection (among other constitutional protections) by discriminating based on religion,
even though the policy was facially neutral with respect to religion. See Washington v.
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2017) (describing equal protection claim
against the travel ban in a case that was later rendered moot); see also Hawaii v. Trump,
859 F.3d 741, 760 (9th Cir.), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 377, 377 (2017) (challenging
Trump’s second executive order banning travel from predominantly Muslim countries).
6 See Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 753–57, 763, 765, 768 (D. Md.
2017) (Transgender military service members’ claim that the Presidential Memorandum,
which directed military to prohibit accession of transgender individuals to the military,
authorize their discharge, and “generally prohibit expenditure of military resources on
sex-reassignment surgeries for military personnel”, violated their equal protection rights
because members alleged that directives “treated [them] differently from all other
military service members,” and the “decision to exclude transgender individuals was not
driven by genuine concerns regarding military efficacy.”).
7 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp.
3d 1304, 1313–15 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (equal protection challenge based on the government’s
rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program).
8 See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 2, Medical Students
for Choice v. Wright, No. 1:17-CV-02096 (D.D.C. dismissed Feb. 6, 2018), ECF No. 1,
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Complai
nt-Medical-Students-for-Choice-vs-Wright.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR3R-2ZKV]. This
complaint, filed in late 2017 in the District of Columbia, challenged interim final rules
the Trump administration implemented, which threatened to curtail access to birth
control coverage for women by creating a broad exemption to the guarantee in the ACA
of coverage for FDA-approved contraceptives without out-of-pocket costs. Id. The
challenged interim rules enabled employers, health insurance providers, and
universities claiming a religious or moral objection to deny their employees, students,
and insurance beneficiaries coverage for contraception. Id. at 3. The plaintiffs argued the
rules violated the Constitution’s Establishment Clause, the equal protection guarantee,
and the fundamental right to contraception by imposing unreasonable burdens upon and
unfairly targeting women. Id. at 3–4.
9 On April 6, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a new “zerotolerance” policy on the United States’ southern border. Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 15, Washington v. United States, No. 2:18-cv-00939 (W. Dist. Wash.
2018), ECF No. 1. Instead of making case-specific evaluations of individual cases,
respecting due process rights and family integrity, the Trump Administration began
prosecuting all possible immigration crimes and detaining all accused adults—even
those with legitimate asylum claims. Id. at 16. The intended and acknowledged effect of
this policy has been the separation of children from their parents. Id. at 19–20. The
Trump Administration has been clear that the purpose of the forced separation policy is
not to protect children, but rather to deter potential immigrants from coming to the
United States. Id. at 4. Although on June 20, 2018, President Trump signed an executive
order that he claims ends the separations, it did not end the underlying policy. Exec.
Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,435 (June 25, 2018).
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policy.10 The federal courts appear ready, willing, and able to
entertain these challenges.11
This article explores the new frontier of potential equal
protection challenges using federal immigration law as an
example, specifically, the law governing Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status (SIJS).12 SIJS opens a pathway for
undocumented immigrant children who are in the United States
without a parent in order to obtain legal status. It is unique both
in the context of immigration law and the general canon of
federal law. The SIJS law embodies a bifurcated legal
framework that requires SIJS applicants to apply first to the
state courts to obtain predicate factual findings based on state
family law, including findings that SIJS applicants cannot be
reunified with a parent because of abuse, abandonment, or
neglect, and that it would not be in the child’s best interest to be
returned to their home country. If the SIJS applicants obtain the
state court predicate findings, they must then apply to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for approval, and if the
applications are granted, the SIJS applicants obtain lawful
permanent residence in the United States.13
This shared role of state courts and federal agencies and
their respective realms of authority under the SIJS law are
ambiguous and susceptible to different and inconsistent
interpretations. On occasion, the state courts have exceeded
their authority and interpreted the SIJS statute to apply their
own legal standards, which effectively prevents certain
applicants from obtaining the requisite predicate findings.14
Because DHS is not authorized to review a state court’s refusal
to issue SIJS findings, this refusal results in the automatic
denial of the application by DHS. Consequently, the availability
of SIJS may depend on the state where the predicate findings
are sought, rather than the merits of the application. As a result,
similarly situated SIJS applicants in different states will obtain
inconsistent outcomes. For these reasons, a state court’s denial
of a request for predicate SIJS findings based on the state court’s
10 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 9 at 2, 115–
16 (state attorneys general of seventeen states challenge the Trump Administration’s
policy of separating families crossing the nation’s southern border on the basis that the
policy violates the Constitution’s guarantees of due process and equal protection); Teri
Kanefield & Jed Shugerman, Trump’s Family Separations are Unconstitutional, SLATE
(June 21, 2018, 5:33 PM) https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/trumps-familyseparation-policy-is-unconstitutional-its-time-for-the-courts-to-award-damages.html
[https://perma.cc/F4C5-Y4A4].
11 See Siegel, supra note 4.
12 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012).
13 See infra note 103.
14 See infra Sections III.A.1, III.A.2.
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unique interpretation of federal law offends the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection under the law. This article
proposes that the only viable solution to remedy the problems
that plague SIJS is a novel challenge to the SIJS law in the
federal courts, asserting that the subsection of the law which
empowers the state courts to make SIJS eligibility findings
violates the equal protection guarantees included in the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the
background and legal framework of the equal protection doctrine
as it exists in the Fourteenth Amendment and as it has been read
into the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This Part also
describes the development of equal protection jurisprudence in
the context of immigration law. Part II explores the development
of the law of SIJS. It begins with a brief history of unaccompanied
children immigrating to the United States before the enactment
of SIJS in 1990, as well as the trends in the migration of
unaccompanied children and changes to the SIJS law over the last
twenty-seven years. This Part also highlights the significant legal
and prudential problems with SIJS. Solutions to the problems
with the SIJS legal framework previously proposed in the
academic scholarship, including proposals to amend SIJS and its
governing regulations, are also identified and deconstructed. This
Part concludes by explaining that given the current political
climate in the federal executive and legislative branches, none of
the previously proposed fixes or changes to SIJS will be
implemented, and thus a new approach is required.
Part III explores how the SIJS legal framework deprives
SIJS applicants of equal protection and offers as an example the
Nebraska and California courts’ respective interpretations of the
SIJS statute to demonstrate how SIJS denies equal protection.
This Part also describes the proposed remedy—a challenge to
the SIJS law in the federal courts—asserting that the law
violates the equal protection guarantees included the the
Federal Constitution. This Part also argues why this unique
equal protection challenge will likely succeed.
Finally, Part IV ponders why an equal protection challenge
to the SIJS legal framework has not previously been suggested in
the legal academic scholarship or pursued in the courts. This Part
asserts that in light of the federal courts’ increasing willingness to
entertain equal protection challenges against the actions of the
current presidential administration, the time has come for a fullscale equal protection challenge to the SIJS law.
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BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION DOCTRINE

A.

The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause

77

The Declaration of Independence’s proclamation that “all
men are created equal” memorialized for the first time on the
American continent an idea of equality that has ancient origins
in Western civilization.15 The idea of equality under the law—
that every similarly situated person should be treated the same
by the government—appears in American history to have first
passed from the aspirational to the juridical in the 1850s.16
Fifteen years later, in the aftermath of the Civil War,
Congress proposed “equal protection” of the law in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which embodied the new and
radical idea17 that a state shall not “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.”18 It appears that the
catalysts for passage of the Fourteenth Amendment were a desire
to explicitly and deliberately reject the constitutional order
described in Chief Justice Taney’s Dred Scott opinion19 and
replace it with one that was in all respects its opposite.20 The
15 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also James
Sullivan, The Antecedents of the Declaration of Independence, 1 ANN. REP. AM. HIST.
ASS’N 80 (1902); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM
ch. 2 (1949). The values of freedom and equality have ancient roots: Cicero considered
liberty and equality to be necessary complements to each other in a free society of equal
citizens. See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, THE REPUBLIC THE LAWS bk.1.47, p.21 (Niall
Rudd trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
16 See Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 201–05 (Mass. 1849) (Charles
Sumner’s argument against school segregation); see also John P. Frank & Robert F.
Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of the Laws,” 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 131, 138–40 (1950), updated and reprinted in 1972 WASH. U. L. REV. 421.
17 See Henry Steele Commager, Equal Protection as an Instrument of Revolution,
in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 467 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1980).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (The first section of the amendment offered
“equal protection of the laws”: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”). The amendment also answered the citizenship question
for African-Americans after the Civil War. “All persons born or naturalized in the United
States . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Id. And
it extended “due process” to the states, not just the federal government. Id.
19 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–05, 416 (1857). In
Dred Scott, Justice Taney had written that black people had not been included in “[We
the P]eople of the United States” because they were “considered as a subordinate and
inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority.” Id. at 404–05.
20 See Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12–16 (1977); see also
JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 201 (First Collier Books 1965). But see WILLIAM
E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE 40–63 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1988) (arguing that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is ambiguous, the product of the framers’ political compromises, and that its
specific legal meaning and impact was only emergent). On passage of the Fourteenth
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amendment was also motivated by the framers’ fear that
important Reconstruction laws might be invalidated on the
grounds that Congress exceeded its authority in enacting them.21
Since the term had no significant history before
incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment, the original
understanding and intent of “equal protection” are difficult to
discern and have led to debates about its meaning.22 For
instance, Congress gave the amendment’s entire first section, in
which the Equal Protection Clause is found, little attention.23 On
the one hand, moderates in Congress wanted to limit the rights
protected to the “civil rights” enumerated in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, such as the right to contract and hold property.24 In
contrast, more progressive members of Congress sought broader
coverage that could expand with changing circumstances.25
Scholars of congressional history have suggested that the
Fourteenth Amendment was amenable to several interpretations.26
First, that its immediate object was the protection of specific “civil
rights” without contemplation of such changes in the social
order as desegregation would entail; and second, that a more
expansive interpretation is required given the general language

Amendment, see generally HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (William S. Hein & Co.,1908); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (D. Philip Locklin et al. eds., 1956); JOURNAL OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., 1865–1867 (B. Kendrick ed.,
1914). On the framing of the Equal Protection Clause specifically, see ROBERT J. HARRIS,
THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, & THE SUPREME COURT 32–33
(La. State Univ. Press ed., 1960) (explaining that Congressional Representative John A.
Bingham led the drive for the Fourteenth Amendment, first proposing it in January 1866);
TENBROEK, supra note 20 at 207 (explaining that in every subsequent draft, the objective
of guaranteeing “equal protection” never changed). Congress passed the amendment in
June 1866, and ratification was completed in 1868. NELSON, supra note 20, at 58–60.
21 See e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The Act’s constitutional
validity had been challenged by Andrew Johnson in his veto message and by
conservatives of both parties in Congress. See Karst, supra note 20, at 14. Contemporary
concepts of equality before the law, understood in the privileges and immunities context,
were most fully captured in the 1866 Civil Rights Act. That measure, enacted as its title
proclaimed “to protect all Persons in the United States in their civil rights,” first
conferred national citizenship. 14 Stat. 27. It then affirmed that all citizens “shall have
the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property” as whites.
Id. The law also protected the rights of contract, property, and juridical capacity (as
witness and party) of those citizens. Id.
22 See Frank & Munro, supra note 16, at 138–42; see also Alexander M. Bickel, The
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1, 31–33 (1955).
23 Bickel, supra note 22 at 47–48.
24 Id. at 56; see also Lewis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, The Supreme
Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 95–103 (1968) (analyzing the Court’s examination
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866’s legislative history in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968) regarding “private discrimination in the sale or rental of property”).
25 Bickel, supra note 22, at 62–63.
26 See id. at 59–63.
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of the Equal Protection Clause, which on its face was not
limited to racial discrimination.27
Likewise, the understanding and application of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has continued
to evolve and expand in the last 150 years since it was adopted.
It has played a starring role in some of the most prominent cases
of the last century—cases which have had a profound influence
not only on how Americans are treated by the government, but
also on how Americans perceive themselves and treat others. In
the 1873 decision of the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme
Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause was “clearly a
provision for [the African-American] race” and that it did not
apply to economic affairs.28 By 1886, however, as reflected in the
Court’s decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, such a limited
construction of the Fourteenth Amendment had disappeared.29
Supreme Court decisions soon after recognized a more flexible
and broad approach to the Equal Protection Clause. The Court
not only applied the Equal Protection Clause to other racial
groups but also extended it to economic affairs by allowing a
corporation to assert the right.30
Thereafter, in 1896, the Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson,
considered one of first landmark cases to test the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.31 In Plessy, the Supreme
Court said segregation was constitutionally acceptable as long as
the facilities were equal.32 This “separate but equal” mantra
facilitated the birth of the Jim Crow South, in which everything
from water fountains to public schooling were legally segregated.
Nearly sixty years later, in 1954, the Supreme Court used
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
revisit segregation. In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
the Court decided that Kansas’ “[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal,” and thus violated the Equal Protection
Clause.33 The ruling overturned Plessy and forced desegregation.
The Supreme Court has continued to utilize a broader
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in different factual
Id. at 60–63.
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
29 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 373–74 (1886) (the first case in which
the Supreme Court struck down a facially neutral municipal ordinance based on its
discriminatory, disparate impact on resident alien Chinese business owners, recognizing
that non-citizens were entitled to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).
30 See id. at 368; see also Pembina Consol. Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania,
125 U.S. 181, 188–89 (1888) (finding private corporations are “persons” under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
31 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896).
32 Id. at 544.
33 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
27
28
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contexts over the past century. For example, in Bush v. Gore,
amid the Florida recount that would decide the presidential
election of 2000, George W. Bush’s lawyers successfully argued
that the recount of presidential ballots ordered by the Florida
courts violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause because different standards of counting were used in
different counties.34 Likewise, the Supreme Court applied the
Equal Protection Clause in Obergefell v. Hodges to strike down
states’ facially neutral same-sex marriage bans in 2015.35 In its
equal protection analysis, the Court was troubled by same-sex
marriage bans’ adverse impact on gays and lesbians.36 Justice
Anthony Kennedy invoked the equal protection portion of the
amendment to assert that it “prohibits this unjustified infringement
of the fundamental right to marry.”37 And in the last year, the Court
decided the race discrimination case of Cooper v. Harris, in which
the Court found that lawmakers were impermissibly motivated by
race when they drew legislative districts.38
To be sure, the central requirement of the Equal
Protection Clause—requiring states to treat their citizens
equally—has remained unchanged from its earliest, limited
applications in the area of racial discrimination in the 1880s to
its expansion in the 2000s to other classes of individuals who,
though not expressly singled out under the law, have suffered
from its disparate impact. Over time, “[j]udges deciding cases
under the Equal Protection Clause have . . . defined . . . ‘equal
treatment’” differently for different classifications of individuals.39
In all instances, however, an equal protection violation may be
found where, depending on the level of scrutiny applied to the
law,40 the discrimination cannot be justified. The common thread
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100, 104–07 (2000) (per curiam).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
36 See id. at 2601–08.
37 Id. at 2604.
38 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481–82 (2017) (finding that lawmakers
improperly packed black voters into a few legislative districts to diminish the power of
black voters).
39 LENORA M. LAPIDUS, EMILY J. MARTIN, & NAMITA LUTHRA, THE RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO WOMEN’S RIGHTS 2 (2009)
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/about/rightsofwomen_chapter1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5
QJ-NYX5] (internal quotations omitted) (explaining that although a state may not pass
laws that treat racial groups unequally, the state can discriminate based on certain
classifications such as age “if [it has] a rational reason for doing so”).
40 Traditionally, courts have applied three degrees of scrutiny in analyzing
challenged statutes under the Equal Protection Clause: “strict scrutiny,” “intermediate”
or “heightened” scrutiny, and “rational review.” See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–18
nn.14–16. (1982); the choice among the three levels depends upon the nature of the
statute in question. If the legislative classification on its face or as applied disadvantages
a “suspect class” or impinges upon the exercise of a “fundamental right,” then the courts
employ strict scrutiny. Id. at 216–17. The statute will fail unless the government can
34
35
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running through all of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence—from Plessy to Harris—is that
the actor is the “state.”
B.

Equal Protection Under the Fifth Amendment

On its face, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to
“state” actions; it does not constrain actions by the federal
government.41 In fact, no provision in the Federal Constitution
expressly requires the federal government to secure equal
protection for its citizens.42 Consequently, the Court has looked
elsewhere—specifically to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause—to find the basic right of equals to equality under federal
law. Chief Justice Taft spearheaded the effort to root equal
protection within due process when, in 1921, he wrote that the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses are “associated” and may
“overlap” in that a violation of one clause violates the other.43 He
further observed that although the Due Process Clause “secure[s]
equality of law in the sense that it makes a required minimum of
protection for everyone’s right of life, liberty and property . . . . [o]ur
whole system of law is predicated on the general, fundamental
principle of equality of application of the law.”44

demonstrate that the “classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.” Id. at 217. If the “classification, while not facially invidious,
nonetheless give[s] rise to recurring constitutional difficulties,” it will be tested under
intermediate scrutiny. Id. Such difficulties arise, for example, when a statute
discriminates against a class which shares some of the characteristics of the suspect
classes. See id. at 218–23; see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1090 (1st ed. 1978). To withstand
intermediate scrutiny, the statutory classification “must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216; Lalli v. Lalli,
439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978). If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then
the statute will be tested for mere rationality—that the classification at issue bears some
fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added);
see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“The Fifth Amendment . . . does not
contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies
only to the states.”).
42 See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) (“Unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth contains no equal protection clause and it provides no
guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress.”) see also Helvering v. Lerner
Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463, 468 (1941).
43 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331–32 (1921).
44 Id. at 332; see also Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937)
(“[W]e assume that discrimination, if gross enough, is equivalent to confiscation and
subject under the Fifth Amendment to challenge and annulment.”).
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Thirty years later, the Court had another opportunity to
recognize equal protection principles in the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause in connection with the school desegregation
cases. In Bolling v. Sharpe, for example, a companion case to
Brown v. Board of Education, the Court held that the equal
protection principles of Brown would apply to District of
Columbia schools through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.45 Specifically the Court noted that the concepts of “equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American
ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive,” and although “‘equal
protection of the laws’ is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited
unfairness than ‘due process of law’. . . . discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”46 Indeed, after
Bolling, the Court has consistently reiterated that equal
protection analysis embedded in the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment.47 The Court has thus applied much of its
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence to strike
down sex classifications in federal legislation,48 overturn
classifications with an adverse impact upon illegitimate

Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
Id.
47 See Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (“Equal protection analysis in the
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach to Fifth
Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
48 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686, 1690, 1698 (2017)
(invalidating gender-based distinction applicable to acquisition of United States citizenship
by child born abroad to one parent who was United States citizen and another parent who
was citizen of another nation, under which only one year of continuous physical presence
was required before unwed mothers could pass citizenship to their children, but five years
of continuous physical presence were required of unwed fathers); accord Tuan Anh Nguyen
v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57, 60 (2001) (involving a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge
to a federal gender classification with differing rules for unwed mothers and for unwed
fathers in their ability to confer derivative citizenship); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76,
84, 88–89 (1979) (holding unconstitutional provision of unemployed-parent benefits
exclusively to fathers); see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206–07 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (holding unconstitutional a Social Security classification that denied widowers
survivors’ benefits available to widows); Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 648–53 (1975) (holding
unconstitutional a Social Security classification that excluded fathers from receipt of childin-care benefits available to mothers); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688–91 (plurality opinion)
(holding unconstitutional exclusion of married female officers in the military from benefits
automatically accorded married male officers); cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74, 76–77
(1971) (holding unconstitutional a probate-code preference for a father over a mother as
administrator of a deceased child’s estate).
45
46

2018]

SIJS IN THE AGE OF TRUMP

83

children,49 and invalidated some welfare assistance provisions.50
Almost all legislation, however, involves some degree of
classification among particular categories of persons, things, or
events. Just as the Equal Protection Clause does not outlaw
“reasonable” classifications, the Due Process Clause is no more
tolerant of the great variety of social and economic legislation
typically containing what must be arbitrary line-drawing.51 As
the next section will explore, the federal government has
historically been endowed with some authority to classify
persons upon certain grounds.
C.

The Equal Protection Doctrine in the Immigration Law
Context

The application of equal protection principles grounded
in the Fifth Amendment has salience in the context of
immigration law because the federal government has exclusive
regulatory authority over immigration, citizenship, and
alienage.52 As the Court has observed, “[t]he federal sovereign,
like the States, must govern impartially. . . . [B]ut . . . there may
be overriding national interests which justify selective federal
legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State.”53
Historically, the Supreme Court deferred to the federal
government in the realm of immigration.54 This power to
49 Compare Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 637 (holding unconstitutional a Social
Security classification denying benefits to one subclass of illegitimate children), with
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 512–16 (1976) (holding the same Social Security
classification did not unconstitutionally discriminate by withholding a presumption of
dependency to one subclass of illegitimate children).
50 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973); see also U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
51 Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 642–43 (1986) (food Stamp Act limitation of
benefits to households of related persons who prepare meals together held constitutional);
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971). With respect to courts and criminal
legislation, see United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 324 (1976); Marshall v. United
States, 414 U.S. 417, 428–30 (1974); Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 590 (1973).
52 See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (immigration and alienage are
the exclusive province of the federal government, and therefore states may not regulate
or criminalize matters related to immigration or alienage).
53 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976). Thus, the power over
immigration and aliens permitted federal discrimination on the basis of alienage. Id. at
100–01 (employment restrictions like those previously voided when imposed by States);
see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85–87 (1976) (permitting discrimination on the
basis of durational residency); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798–99 (1977) (allowing
discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy). Similar rules by States would be voided.
54 Indeed, as early as May 1889, the Supreme Court ruled that “[t]he power of
exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty . . . cannot be granted away or
restrained.” Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581, 609 (1889). Later during the Cold War, the Court reaffirmed the plenary power
doctrine by holding that “it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly
authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government
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regulate immigration and naturalization is the principal
example of the national government’s ability to classify upon
some grounds—alienage, but also other suspect and quasisuspect categories as well—that would result in invalidation
were a state to enact them.55
Traditionally, the courts divided immigrants into
“two . . . categories: (1) lawful permanent residents . . . (immigrants
who have been granted permission to live and work in the United
States), and (2) inadmissible aliens (non-citizens who entered the
country without authorization or who are otherwise ineligible to
enter the country or remain).”56 The government has typically
granted lawful permanent residents “greater rights and privileges”
than those granted to inadmissible aliens.57 Thus, what appears in
the context of immigration law is a sliding scale of rights, greatest
in a naturalized citizen and least in a non-resident, non-citizen
without any immigration status. In between these two are
numerous other categories including those who are permanent
legal residents,58 who have “rights” that are “more extensive and
to exclude a given alien.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543
(1950). More recently, in February 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that “a nation-state has the inherent right to exclude
or admit foreigners and to prescribe applicable terms and conditions for their exclusion
and admission.” Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 559
U.S. 131 (2010). The principle “to decide which alien may, and which alien may not, enter
the United States, and on what terms,” Judge Randolph firmly asserted, “has been a
matter of political determination by each State—‘a matter wholly outside the concern
and competence of the [j]udiciary.’” Id. at 1026 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 596 (1952)) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
55 “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially
different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over
immigration and naturalization.” Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86–87. That is so, because “it is the
business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of. . . the
States . . . to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens.” Id. at 84.
56 Andrew Bramante, Note, Ending Indefinite Detention of Non-Citizens, 61
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 933, 938 (2011) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
57 Id.; see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 389 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“[C]onstitutional questions raised by detaining inadmissible aliens are
different from those raised by detaining admitted aliens.”) (emphasis omitted); Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (“The alien, to whom the United States has been
traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as
he increases his identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in the country creates
an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights.”). Lawful permanent
residents have the right to live and work permanently in the United States and “[b]e
protected by all laws of the United States . . . state[s] . . . and local jurisdictions.” Rights and
Responsibilities of a Green Card Holder (Permanent Resident), U.S. CUSTOMS &
IMMIGRATION SERVICES (July 15, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/after-greencard-granted/rights-and-responsibilities-permanent-resident/rights-and-responsibilities
-green-card-holder-permanent-resident [https://perma.cc/9S7X-WAHU].
58 In In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1973) and Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), the Court subjected state laws disadvantaging legal aliens to
strict scrutiny. In Graham, the Court struck down a law that conditioned the payment
of state welfare benefits on citizenship. 403 U.S. at 374–75. Preserving limited state
resources for citizens was not found to be a sufficiently compelling interest. Id. In
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secure” because the person has made a “preliminary declaration of
intention to become a citizen.”59 Since immigration laws tend to
single out and discriminate against people based on their ethnic,
national origin or cultural status, the Supreme Court has often
scrutinized the laws under the equal protection framework.60
The tension between protecting the rights of the
discriminated against “other” and safeguarding national security
and national sovereignty is on display at the intersection of
immigration and the equal protection doctrine. For example, in
Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court upheld federal military
orders regarding Japanese internment, concluding that although
such orders discriminated against citizens of Japanese ancestry,
they did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.61 In Hirabayashi,
the Court recognized that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are, by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.
For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on
race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection.”62
Nonetheless, the Court also found no equal protection violation
given the government’s interest in securing the country during
wartime, concluding that “the challenged orders and statute
afforded a reasonable basis for the action taken.”63
Undocumented immigrants have also challenged laws
under the Equal Protection Clause with varying degrees of
success.64 For example, in Plyler v. Doe, a case examining the
legality of a school admission policy that restricted the
registration of children of undocumented immigrants, the Court
ultimately struck down the restrictions as violating equal
protection.65 The Court, however, initially dismissed the idea that
undocumented aliens were a suspect class, which would warrant
heightened review. Specifically, the Court held that an
individual’s undocumented status did not permit the same level
Griffiths, the Court considered a state law that restricted bar membership to citizens.
413 U.S. at 724. Again, a majority of the Court applied strict scrutiny to strike down
the law, finding citizenship to not be closely related to one’s ability to fulfill the
responsibilities of a lawyer. Id.
59 Johnson, 339 U.S. at 770.
60 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210–11 (1982).
61 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100–01 (1943).
62 Id. at 100.
63 Id. at 100–01. For its part, the Hirabayashi Court relied on Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). In Yick Wo, the Court held that “any person” in the text
of the Fourteenth Amendment was “universal in [it’s] application to all persons . . . without
regard to any differences of . . . nationality.” Id.
64 See e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (involving a successful
challenge based on equal protection to a law that excluded children of undocumented
immigrants from public education).
65 Id. at 230.
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of constitutional protections afforded to legal residents.66
Therefore, it seemed that the Plyler Court had decided to apply the
less demanding rational basis review. This notwithstanding, the
Plyler majority emphasized that the class at issue was the children
of undocumented immigrants, not just undocumented immigrants
in general.67 The Court stated that the state’s exclusion of these
children from educational opportunities “impos[ed] a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children,” who were in a particularly
vulnerable position through no fault of their own.68 The Court,
therefore, required the state to point to a “substantial goal”
furthered by the law to justify the discrimination.69 Although the
Supreme Court explicitly stated that it would use rational basis
review, the “substantial goal” language implied that the Court was
applying some form of heightened scrutiny.70
Plyler has particular relevance to an examination of the
treatment of undocumented juveniles seeking SIJS and the
impediments they face navigating the SIJS legal framework, as
discussed in Part II. Additionally, as asserted in Part III, Plyler
provides significant support to the proposed cure to SIJS’s endemic
problems—an equal protection challenge to the SIJS law.
II.

THE SIJS EXAMPLE

A.

Unaccompanied Immigrant Children in the United
States Before 1990 and the Laws that Affected Them

Children have been immigrating to the United States
without parents or guardians at least as early as 1892 when Ellis

Id. at 219–20.
Id. at 220.
68 Id. at 223–24.
69 Id. at 224.
70 Id. In addition to the language in Plyler acknowledging that undocumented
children were “persons” entitled to equal protection, the Plyler Court also introduced the
idea that undocumented children are particularly vulnerable and thus the laws that
discriminate against them are subject to some level of judicial scrutiny higher than
rational basis. Id. at 223–24. The framework of providing heighten protections to
undocumented minors that Plyer introduced has been successfully used to challenge
state laws that target them. For example, Alabama enacted HB 56, the “Alabama
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act,” in 2011, which “required schools to conduct a
census of undocumented children in schools, until it was enjoined by the trial and circuit
judges.” Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 ALA.
LAWS 535 (H.B. 56); Michael A. Olivas, Undocumented Children 30 Years After Plyler,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/undocumentedchildren-30-years-after-plyler/ [https://perma.cc/XR9Q-WDYY]. In addition, Plyer, and
its result of opening the public schools to undocumented children, has been credited with
generating wide-spread acceptance of undocumented children and motivating such
legislation as the DREAM act. See id.
66
67
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Island began processing immigrants.71 For the next one hundred
years, hundreds of thousands of unaccompanied children, or
unaccompanied alien children (UAC) as they are characterized
under the law,72 have come to the United States to escape war,
famine, and poverty from crisis-ridden areas around the world.73
In that process they have been aided by charities, immigrant aid
societies, and sometimes even the United States government.74
71 See Sam Roberts, Story of the First Through Ellis Island Is Rewritten, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/14/nyregion/14annie.html
[https://perma.cc/7MNY-LPJT]. An unaccompanied child named Annie Moore was the
first immigrant to step off the first ship that brought immigrants to Ellis Island on January
1, 1892, the day it initially opened. Id. Annie was awarded a $10 gold liberty coin for being
the first to register. Id. Most unaccompanied children, however, came to the United States
in less desirable circumstances, and many were turned away. See Tasneem Raja, Child
Migrants Have Been Coming to America Alone Since Ellis Island, MOTHER JONES (July 18,
2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/07/child-migrant-ellis-islandhistory [https://perma.cc/BG4L-Z23M]. Unaccompanied children who were determined to
come to the United States but were unable to purchase ship tickets often stowed away by
hiding in the various inconspicuous areas of ships. Id. Henry Armetta was a famous actor
in Hollywood’s golden age who came to America from Italy stowed away on a ship bound
for Ellis Island in 1902. Id. Armetta was not sent back to Italy because a local Italian offered
to sponsor him. Id. Not all stowaways managed to remain in the United States, even the
most persistent ones. See, e.g., Sam Apple, The Boy Who Was Desperate to Be an
American, L.A. TIMES (July 5, 2014, 12:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-oeapple-axelrod-immigrant-minor-stowaway-20140706-story.html [https://perma.cc/48ZYHXVU]. For example, twelve-year-old Benjamin Axelrod reportedly stowed away on ships
bound for New York seven times over the course of two years and was sent back each time.
Id.
72 Under 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012), “unaccompanied alien child” is defined as a
child that:

(A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States; (B) has not attained
18 years of age; and C) with respect to whom (i) there is no parent or legal
guardian in the United States; or (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United
States is available to provide care or physical custody.
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (2002) (codified
as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 279(g) (2012)).
73 Daniel J. Steinbock, The Admission of Unaccompanied Children into the
United States 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 141–42 (1989).
74 BARRY MORENO, IMAGES OF AMERICA: CHILDREN OF ELLIS ISLAND 7–8 (Arcadia
Publishing 2005). Charitable sponsors often purchased bonds, which allowed the children to
be admitted to the United States. See id. at 8. For instance, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid
Society purchased bonds for Jewish children whose parents were killed by anti-Semitic
pogroms in Eastern Europe. See Tasneem Raja, Child Migrants Have Been Coming to
America Alone Since Ellis Island, MOTHER JONES (July 18, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/07/child-migrant-ellis-island-history [https://
perma.cc/BG4L-Z23M]. The oppression of the Jews in Germany in the years preceding
and during World War II also sparked multiple organizations to rescue Jewish children from
Nazi persecution. Jewish Aid & Rescue, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM: HOLOCAUST
ENCYC., https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/jewish-aid-and-rescue [https://
perma.cc/N5SQ-4EGG]. The largest immigration of unaccompanied children into the United
States prior to 2000 occurred in the 1960’s during what is now known as ‘Operation Pedro
Pan’ when over 14,000 unaccompanied children were admitted to the United States. History,
OPERATION PEDRO PAN GROUP, INC. (2009), http://www.pedropan.org/category/history
[https://perma.cc/54AJ-TKEH]. When diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba
were broken, unaccompanied Cuban children fled, and were sent by their parents on
commercial flights to the United States, Florida in particular. Id. At the time, the U.S.
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Since the arrival of the first UAC, various laws have
affected the status of these children. The Immigration Act of
1907 placed “all children under sixteen years of age,
unaccompanied by one or both of their parents” on a list of
excluded immigrants.75 In an apparent attempt to relax the
exclusion of unaccompanied children, the Immigration Act of
1917 provided that children whose parents were already in the
United States were no longer excluded, and gave the Secretary
of Labor discretion to admit unaccompanied children if “in his
opinion they are not likely to become a public charge and are
otherwise eligible.”76 In 1940, Congress passed a law allowing
authorized American rescue ships to save refugee children from
war zones and bring them to the United States on the condition
that there was an American person or corporation ensuring that
the child did not become a public charge.77 Then, in 1947,
Congress adopted the Constitution of the International Refugee
Organization, which included a provision that unaccompanied
children under the age of sixteen “who are war orphans or whose
parents have disappeared, and who are outside their countries
of origin, shall be given all possible priority assistance.”78 In
1953, Congress passed a law to allow non-quota immigrant visas
to be issued to “eligible orphans” under ten years old, which
allowed them to be adopted from abroad.79 The Refugee Act of
1980 created the Office of Refugee Resettlement within the
Department of State encouraged the children to come by waiving visa requirements for
these children. Id.
75 Immigration Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, 34 Stat. 898, 898–99. In addition to
unaccompanied children the act sets forth additional exclusions, such as: (a) persons deemed
to have physical or mental defects that might affect their ability to support themselves; (b)
persons infected with tuberculosis; and (c) so-called “feeble minded” persons. Id. at 898.
76 Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat 874, 876.
77 Act of Aug. 27, 1940, ch. 695, Pub. L. No. 76-776, 54 Stat. 866, 866 (amending
Neutrality Act of 1939).
78 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, opened for signature
Dec. 15, 1946, annex I, pt. I, § A, 62 Stat. 3037, 3050, 18 U.N.T.S. 18 (entered into force
Aug. 20, 1948).
79 Act of July 29, 1953, ch. 268, Pub. L. No. 83-162, 67 Stat. 229, 229. Eligible
orphan is defined in part as a child who has experienced the death, abandonment, or
disappearance of one or both parents, and the remaining parent is incapable of caring
for the child and “irrevocably release[s] the child for emigration and adoption.” Id. In
1957, Congress amended the act to, among other things, increase the age of eligible
orphans to fourteen years old and allow visas to be issued until June 30, 1959. See Act
of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639, 639. Congress later amended the act
in 1959 to extend the term whereby visas could be granted to immigrant orphans to June
30, 1960. See Act of Sept. 9, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-253, 73 Stat. 490, 490. In 1961, Congress
permanently permitted adoption of eligible children under the age of fourteen by U.S.
Citizens. See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, 650. In 1981, the
age of eligible orphans was raised to sixteen years old. Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments of 1981, § 2(b), Pub. L. No. 97-116, 95 Stat. 1611, 1611 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012)).
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Department of Health and Human Services and detailed
procedures and programs to help with refugees’ interactions
with the government.80 The history of the last century—prior to
1990—shows a progressive federal legal and regulatory approach,
reflecting clear, open pathways for admission to the United States
for these unaccompanied children.
B.

The Immigration of Unaccompanied Immigrant
Children After 1990 and Emergence of SIJS
1. The Roots of SIJS and Its Evolution to the Present

Originally enacted as a part of the Immigration Act of
1990,81 the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS),82 a
seemingly minor and uncontroversial addition to the landscape
of immigration law, created a pathway to permanent legal status
for certain undocumented immigrant children who had become
dependent on a state’s juvenile courts and for whom return to
their country of origin would not be possible. The provision
stated two basic requirements for SIJS: (1) that the immigrant
child “has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located
in the United States and has been deemed eligible by that court
for long-term foster care;” and (2) that it is not “in the [child’s]
best interest to be returned to the [child]’s or parent’s previous
country of nationality or country of last habitual residence.”83
80 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 111–18 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521–1524 (2012)).
81 The Act amended key components of the original 1965 Immigration and
Nationality Act (“the INA”) and was intended to be a broad and sweeping update to the
systems and processes the United States used to legally admit immigrants and to
administer the naturalization of immigrants. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012)).
82 Id. § 153, 104 Stat. 4978, 5005–06; 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2018).
83 § 153, 104 Stat. at 5005–06. In 1991, Congress passed a series of technical
amendments to the INA that explicitly waived these and other grounds of inadmissibility
that presented unintended obstacles to SIJS applicants. See Miscellaneous and
Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 102-232,
sec. 302, 105 Stat. 1733, 1742–46 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h) (2012)). The
1990 amendments also designated SIJS applicants as being deemed paroled into the
United States, effectively avoiding the immigration consequences that would normally
flow from being present in the United States without ever having been legally admitted.
Id.; see also Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile
Court; Revocation of Approval of Petitions; Bona Fide Marriage Exemption to Marriage
Fraud Amendments; Adjustment of Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,843, 42,844–50 (Aug. 12,
1993) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (1993)). Lastly, the 1991 amendments stated
unequivocally that nothing in either the SIJS statute or these new amendments
permitted an alien to be admitted into the United States, or apply for admission, for the
purpose of obtaining SIJS. sec. 302, 105 Stat. at 1745. The legislative materials and
conference reports accompanying the 1991 legislation are silent as to the purpose for
including the prohibition against permitting an alien to be admitted into the United
States, or to apply for admission, for the purpose of obtaining SIJS. However, the
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The creation of SIJS was a response to a growing humanitarian
concern over the welfare of undocumented children, who had been
victims of parental abandonment, abuse, or neglect,84 that began
to immigrate to the United States at the end of the last century.85
The SIJS statute sought to address this humanitarian concern in
two ways: first by creating a path to permanent residency for
these children, and second by including a standard that required
a determination of whether deportation of the child back to their
home country or previous country of residence would really serve
the best interests of the child.86 Given, however, that the federal
court system has no family law courts, Congress delegated to
state courts the duty to render the juvenile dependency and best
interest of the child determinations.87
Congressional Research Service commentary regarding the purpose behind the enactment
of the 1991 Amendment indicates that the text of the original statute contained a type of
loop-hole that would potentially permit an immigrant to apply for and obtain admission
into the United States explicitly for the purpose of obtaining SIJS. See RUTH WASEM, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43703, SPECIAL IMMIGRATION JUVENILES: IN BRIEF 3 (2014).
84 § 153, 104 Stat. at, 5005–06; see also Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105119, sec. 113. 111 Stat. 2440, 2460; Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting
Undocumented Immigrant Children from their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or How to
Ameliorate the Impact of the 1997 Amendments to the SIJ Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J.,
237, 240, 245 (2006); WASEM, supra note 83, at 3.
85 Beginning in the 1990s, large numbers of unaccompanied children came to the
United States came from Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. See WILLIAM A.
KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43599, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: AN
OVERVIEW 1–3 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43599.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YBM4P55]. Like their counterparts in the last one hundred years, UAC are escaping “[h]igh
violent crime rates, poor economic conditions fueled by relatively low economic growth
rates, relatively high poverty rates, and the presence of transnational gangs” in their
countries of origin. WILLIAM A. KANDEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43628,
UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: POTENTIAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO RECENT
IMMIGRATION 3 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43628.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RF5B9GJ]. Out of the nine sectors of the Southwest border that the United States Border Patrol
monitors, the overwhelming majority of UAC arrive in the Southwest sector. See Statement
by Secretary Johnson on Southwest Border Security, United States Border Patrol
Southwest Family Unit Subject and Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions Fiscal
Year 2016, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.cbp.gov/
newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016 [https://perma.cc/
MT5N-2BFC] In total, from 2008 through August 2016, at least 277,798 UAC were
encountered by United States Border Patrol. See id. In the first two years of the Trump
administration, apprehension of undocumented individual and family units by the Board
Patrol has increased overall, with more 80,000 apprehensions of UAC from the fall of 2016
through the end of July 2018. See U.S. Southwest Border Migration FY 2018, U.S. CUSTOMS
& BORDER PROTECTION (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-bordermigration [https://perma.cc/BJ6U-SGR6]; U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border
Apprehensions by Sector FY 2017, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions-fy2017 [https://
perma.cc/42HY-8JU8].
86 § 153, 104 Stat. at 5005–26; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2018).
87 Neither the legislation itself, nor the accompanying conference report
contain any commentary explaining Congress’ purpose behind the enactment of SIJS.
The Congressional Research Service and scholarly commentary regarding the purpose
behind the enactment of SIJS consistently agree, however, that the purpose for having
the State courts render the juvenile dependency determinations was to leverage the child
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By the late 1990s, however, a concern emerged among
lawmakers that parents were purposely abandoning their
children so they could obtain SIJS.88 As a result, Congress
amended the act to specify in the first requirement that the child
is “eligible . . . for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or
abandonment.”89 In 1997, Congress added a third requirement
making it necessary that the Attorney General consent90 to the
dependency order.91 The Homeland Security Act of 200292 shifted
most enforcement responsibilities from the Department of
Justice’s INS to the Department of Homeland Security.93
Furthermore, in 2006, Congress supplied the guideline that a child
should never be compelled to contact their alleged abuser in
applying for SIJS, sacrificing efficiency for the welfare of the child.94
In 2008, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which applied directly to UAC and
set out detailed rules, policies, and guidelines that also amended
welfare expertise that state courts already possessed, which the federal government
lacked. See, e.g., WASEM, supra note 83, at 3; Jessica R. Pulitzer, Note, Fear and Failing
in Family Court: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and the State Court Problem, 21
CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 201, 212 (2014); see also Lloyd, supra note 84 at 243. It is worth
noting that standards based on the best interests of the child are not new in American
family law courts, and states apply a “best interests of the child” standard when making
determinations on a citizen child’s custody or placement with a guardian, for example.
See Pulitzer, supra note 87, at 202–03.
88 By 1997, there was a growing concern in Congress, championed by former
Arizona Senator Peter Domenici, that college age Mexican nationals were abusing SIJS
to gain lawful permanent residency, so they could attend United States colleges and
universities. See Lloyd, supra note 84, at 239 n.12, 244 n.44. That year, Congress
addressed those concerns by passing the first significant amendments to the statutory
language that created SIJS. Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, Act of Nov. 26,
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, sec. 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2460–61; H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at
130 (1997) (Conf. Rep.); see also WASEM, supra note 83, at 3.
89 Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2460
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012)).
90 The 1997 amendment divided “consent” into “express” consent for
undocumented juvenile immigrants that were not in the custody of the federal
government, and “specific” consent for undocumented juvenile immigrants that were in
federal custody. Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, sec. 113, 111 Stat. at 2460
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) (2012)).
91 Id.
92 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 462, 116 Stat. 2135,
2202–05 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2012)).
93 Id.; see also WASEM, supra note 83, at 3 n.3. DHS was not, however,
transferred the responsibility for the custody and care of unaccompanied immigrant
children. Instead the Homeland Security Act gave those responsibilities to the Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR) within the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS). Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 462 116 Stat. at 2202–05 (codified as amended
at 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2012)); see also Lauren R. Aronson, The Tipping Point: The Failure of
Form over Substance in Addressing the Needs of Unaccompanied Immigrant Children,
18 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 8 (2015).
94 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960, 3066 (2006) (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1357(h) (2012)).

92

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1

SIJS eligibility requirements.95 First, TVPRA replaced the
requirement that the juvenile is deemed eligible for long-term foster
care with the requirement that “reunification with [one] or both of
the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law.”96 The
TVPRA also amended the SIJS statute and gave consent authority
for undocumented immigrant children not in federal custody to the
Secretary of DHS (rather than the Attorney General), while giving
“specific[ ] ” consent authority for undocumented immigrant children
in federal custody to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.97
Additionally, the statute now permitted a grant of SIJS even in
situations where reunification with one parent presented no risk of
abuse, abandonment, or neglect, so long as reunification with the
other parent was not viable for those reasons.98 Finally, the inclusion
of “similar basis found under state law” language eliminated the
unnecessarily restrictive requirement that SIJS was only available
in cases specifically of abandonment, abuse, and neglect.99
SIJS was now also available to undocumented immigrant
children that were the victims of behavior similar to abandonment,
abuse, or neglect—behavior that the state would normally remove
children from to protect them.100 The TVPRA also added a
requirement that all SIJS applications be adjudicated by DHS
within 180 days of the date upon which the application was filed
with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
It clarified that any undocumented immigrant who was a “child”
on the date his or her SIJS application was filed could not be denied
SIJS regardless of his or her age at the time of adjudication.101
Thus, Congress effectively broadened the scope of people eligible
for SIJS at a time when there was an increasing number of UAC

95 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat 5044, 5074–82 (2008) (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012)).
96 Id. at 5079. The requirement necessitating eligibility for long-term foster
care was added in 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2018). In order to be eligible, children must satisfy
the requirements in both the statute and regulations. § 235, 122 Stat. at 5080.
97 Section 235, 122 Stat. at 5079–80. More significantly, the TVPRA dramatically
altered the consent practice by eliminating the need for “express[ ] ” consent “to the
dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant” of SIJS. Id. Instead, DHS consent
for undocumented immigrant children would function as acknowledgement that the SIJS
request was being sought for the purpose of escaping abandonment, abuse, neglect, and not
for the purpose of gaining legal status. Id. at 5079.
98 Id.
99 See id; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012).
100 See § 235, 122 Stat. at 5079.
101 Id. at 5080.
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arriving in the United States.102 Today, SIJS remains substantially
the same as it was when amended in 2008.103

102 Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir. of Domestic
Operations, USCIS, Pearl Chang, Acting Chief of Office of Policy & Strategy to Field
Leadership (Mar. 24, 2009), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memo
randa/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WS5-9ZRG].
103 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012). It provides:

(27) the term “special immigrant” means—
(J) an immigrant who is present in the United States—
(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United
States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the
custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity
appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose
reunification with [one] or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to
abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law;
(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings
that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or
parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence;
and
(iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of
special immigrant juvenile status, except that—
(I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody status or
placement of an alien in the custody of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services specifically
consents to such jurisdiction; and
(II) no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any alien provided
special immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue
of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this
chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012). The governing regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2018),
prescribe:
An alien is eligible for classification as a special immigrant under section
101(a)(27)(J) of the Act if the alien: (1) Is under twenty-one years of age; (2) Is
unmarried; (3) Has been declared dependent upon a juvenile court located in
the United States in accordance with state law governing such declarations of
dependency, while the alien was in the United States and under the
jurisdiction of the court; (4) Has been deemed eligible by the juvenile court for
long-term foster care; (5) Continues to be dependent upon the juvenile court
and eligible for long-term foster care, such declaration, dependency or
eligibility not having been vacated, terminated, or otherwise ended; and (6)
Has been the subject of judicial proceedings or administrative proceedings
authorized or recognized by the juvenile court in which it has been determined
that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the country of
nationality or last habitual residence of the beneficiary or his or her parent or
parents; or (7) On November 29, 1990, met all the eligibility requirements for
special immigrant juvenile status in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(6) of this
section, and for whom a petition for classification as a special immigrant
juvenile is filed on Form I-360 before June 1, 1994.
8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2018); see also Eligibility Status for SIJ, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS. (July 5, 2011), https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrantjuveniles/eligibility-sij-status/eligibility-status-sij [https://perma.cc/BA84-27Z3].
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2. The Problems with SIJS
SIJS creates a bifurcated state-federal structure and thus
represents a novelty in federal immigration law in that it expressly
requires input and participation from state courts.104 As a result,
certain aspects of the SIJS framework and the unique state-federal
structure have impeded SIJS applicants from obtaining SIJS
protection, therefore making the entire framework susceptible to
scrutiny and criticism from immigration lawyers and scholars.
Immigration legal scholars have thoroughly and
thoughtfully documented the systemic problems with the SIJS
framework, which create unsurmountable obstacles for UAC to
obtain SIJS. These problems include: (1) no right to appointed
counsel and the general lack of affordable, competent immigration
lawyers;105 (2) conflicts between and diffusion of SIJS responsibilities
among federal agencies tasked with administering SIJS;106 (3) the
lack of adequate guidance to the federal authority responsible for
granting consent;107 (4) the application of “privileged, American
parenting standards” which fail to account for familial situations
that may exist “in . . . different socio-economic circumstances” in
other countries;108 (5) the failure to expressly recognize poverty
alone as a legitimate “basis for children seeking a better life in the
United States”;109 and (6) conflicts within DHS itself as the agency

See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2018).
See Laila L. Hlass, States and Status: A Study of Geographical Disparities
for Immigrant Youth, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 266, 267 (2014); Elizabeth Keyes,
Evolving Contours of Immigration Federalism: The Case of Migrant Children, 19 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 33, 38, 82–83 (2016); Randi Mandelbaum & Elissa Steglich, Disparate
Outcomes: The Quest for Uniform Treatment of Immigrant Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV.
606, 613 (2012); M. Aryah Somers et al., Constructions of Childhood and Unaccompanied
Children in the Immigration System in the United States, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL’Y 311, 363 (2010); David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the
Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J. L. &
POL’Y 45, 63 (2005) [hereinafter Thronson, Of Borders]; David B. Thronson, Thinking
Small: The Need for Big Changes in Immigration Law’s Treatment of Children, 14 U.C.
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 239 (2010) [hereinafter Thronson, Thinking Small]; Pulitzer,
supra note 87, at 207.
106 See Keyes, supra note 105, at 71–72; see also Bijal Shah, Uncovering
Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 823 (2015).
107 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 153, 104 Stat. 4978, 5005
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(2012)); see
also Act of Nov. 26, 1997, P.L. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat 2440, 2460 (1997) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012)); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat. at 5079;
H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 130 (1997) (Conf. Rep.); Lloyd, supra note 84, at 239–40.
108 Sarah Rogerson, The Politics of Fear: Unaccompanied Immigrant Children
and the Case of the Southern Border, 61 VILL. L. REV. 843, 886–87 (2016).
109 Id. at 887.
104
105

2018]

SIJS IN THE AGE OF TRUMP

95

attempts to simultaneously enforce the removal of undocumented
children and provide them with a legal path to residency.110
This “disparate geographic access to SIJS, with [the]
uneven [availability of] relief [within state] jurisdictions,” has also
been thoroughly explored in legal scholarship.111 Several scholars
have studied the ways that SIJS availability varies between states.
Professor Laila Hlass, in particular, has examined statistics to
illustrate the tremendous geographic disparity in accessing SIJS.112
These disparities are attributed to factors including variance in
child welfare policies and practices among states, in addition to
differing state laws, which gives rise to divergent state court
definitions of SIJS eligibility terms based on state law.113 Others
writing on this issue have focused on statutory differences, such as
the age limit for state court jurisdiction over minors,114 as well as
case law differences.115
Among the landscape of commentary on the problems that
plague SIJS, this article is the first to argue that the SIJS legal
framework, which has allowed state courts broad authority to
adjudicate SIJS disparately, presents significant equal protection
concerns, and makes the law ripe for an equal protection challenge.
As discussed in Part III, the decisions by the state courts in
Nebraska and California interpreting the plain language of the
SIJS statute demonstrate this problem adroitly.
3. Sensible Remedies and Why They Will Now Fail
The United States’ need for an effective program to address
unaccompanied, undocumented, minor victims of abuse has only
grown in the twenty-seven years since the inception of SIJS. Not
only would such a program serve the best interests of these children
by protecting them from abusive family situations, but it would also
serve the best interests of the United States. Humanitarian
interests would be served by embracing this largely faultless and
See Keyes, supra note 105, at 71.
Id. at 38.
112 See Hlass, supra note 105, at 266–67. As Professor Keyes has observed:
“Professor Hlass’s research both ties into the descriptive understanding of the problems
of state court adjudications, and documents one aspect of the federalism problems in the
current system.” Keyes, supra note 105, at 38 n.11.
113 Id.; see also Pulitzer, supra note 87, at 214–22 (exploring in detail the
problems among and within states in defining and applying “abuse, abandonment and
neglect;” “best interest” standards, as well as the other required eligibility standards).
114 Heryka Knoespel, Note, Special Immigration Justice Status: A “Juvenile”
Here is Not a “Juvenile” There, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 505, 519–20
(2013) (addressing the state juvenile court’s efforts to resolve the challenges faced by
eighteen through twenty-one-year-old SIJS applicants in obtaining SIJS findings).
115 Pulitzer, supra note 87, at 217–18.
110
111
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highly vulnerable undocumented immigrant population;
furthermore, economic interests would be served by integrating
these individuals legally into society, allowing them to both
contribute to and reap the rewards of the most powerful economy on
Earth. Unfortunately, the SIJS program in its current iteration is
simply not up to the task, and the bifurcated structure of state and
federal roles, which may have made sense when SIJS was first
implemented, now impede the program’s success.
a) Proposed Congressional and Executive Branch
Solutions
Scholars writing in this area have proposed sensible
solutions to the problems with SIJS. Many focus on ways to
improve procedures in the state courts or recalibrate the amount
of deference given to state courts’ determinations.116 Professor
Hlass, who extensively documented the differences among state
court applications under SIJS, recommends fixes such as
“forming a working group to analyze SIJS application disparities
and state practices; . . . enacting [new] federal law[s] to increase
state screening and assistance for immigrant children to apply
for SIJS; and . . . amending SIJS to create a federal safeguard to
address state discrepancies.”117 Other possible proposals include
legislative amendments to SIJS to “creat[e] redundant
jurisdiction” so that if SIJS applicants are unable to obtain SIJS
findings from state court, they can seek review and intervention
from the federal government.118 Professor Elizabeth Keyes
proposes a comprehensive reconsideration of the allocation of
power under SIJS and recommends eliminating the state’s role
in making SIJS determinations. Accordingly, she urges “making
SIJS a purely federal immigration process, with a dedicated,
centralized corps of decision-makers akin to the Crime Victims
Unit or the Asylum Corps.”119
Another possible solution that does not rely on
congressional action could originate within the DHS, which could
use the federal rulemaking process to revise SIJS regulations
116 See generally Hlass, supra note 105; Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 105,
at 606; Pulitzer, supra note 87, at 217; Somers et al., supra note 105, at 317; Thronson, Of
Borders, supra note 105, at 48; Thronson, Thinking Small, supra note 105, at 240–41.
117 See Hlass, supra note 105, at 329.
118 Keyes, supra note 105, at 85. Professor Keyes discusses, as an alternative, a
review “process [similar to] that [which] currently exists for T visas, where victims must
attempt to get a law enforcement certification that they cooperated in[ ] an investigation
of human trafficking but can also show USCIS evidence of their efforts to cooperate if
law enforcement refuses to issue a certification for them.” Id.
119 See id. at 86–88.
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concerning the definition of “juvenile court” to provide a federal
department, such as DHS, discretion to achieve the same ends.120
Finally, other administrative fixes for SIJS could be addressed
through the Administrative Appeals Office review process.121
Amending SIJS or revising its implementing regulations, as
suggested here and in other scholarship, would significantly
improve the SIJS framework and resolve the problems that impede
equal access to SIJS. These ideas have much to commend them,
and in a different political climate with different leadership in the
federal government they might have come to pass. In the current
political environment, however, those remedies are only aspirations.
b) All of the Solutions Will Fail: The Lack of the
Political Will to Improve the SIJS Law
Despite the clear need for reform to SIJS demonstrated in
this article and in the other legal academic literature, the
necessary reforms to SIJS will not occur in the near term. The
current President and others in his administration are openly
hostile to most immigration policies, particularly policies regarding
illegal immigrants, as evidenced in the Executive Orders banning

120 DHS could revise the definition of “juvenile court” found in 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.11(a), which provides “[s]pecial immigrant status for certain aliens declared
dependent on a juvenile court.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2018). For the purposes of SIJS, “juvenile
court” currently “means a court located in the United States having jurisdiction under
State law to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of juveniles.” Id. DHS
could amend the SIJS regulation definition of juvenile court to include, “under federal” or
state law. With this change, Federal courts with the jurisdiction to make judicial
determinations about the custody and care of juveniles would have the same authority to
grant SIJS dependency and custody orders that state courts have now. This would likely
include USCIS immigration courts that make judicial determinations about juvenile
refugees and juvenile victims of human trafficking and would certainly include the AAO
which has authority to review certain denied immigration petitions involving children. See
The Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (July
11, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/administrative
-appeals-office-aao/administrative-appeals-office-aao [https://perma.cc/A3CX-RR8J].
121 The current SIJS framework allows for applicants denied SIJS to appeal the
denial to the AAO within USCIS. See The Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), supra
note 120. A judge at the AAO then reviews the denial “to ensure consistency and accuracy
in the interpretation of immigration law and policy” and has the authority to reject the
denial where USCIS improperly applied the law. Id. If the denial of SIJS is rejected, the
judge can issue a precedent decision that becomes binding federal precedent for all future
cases (anywhere in the federal government) involving the same or similar facts. See id.
Precedent decisions are very rare, and they require the Secretary of DHS to directly
petition the Attorney General to approve the AAO decision as binding legal precedent
for the entire federal government. See id. “[P]recedent decisions may announce new legal
interpretations or agency policy, or they may reinforce existing law and policy by
demonstrating how it applies to a unique set of facts.” Id. In the entire twenty-sevenyear history of the SIJS program, there has never been a precedent decision that deals
with SIJS. DHS/AAO/INS Decisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.
justice.gov/eoir/dhs-aao-ins-decisions [https://perma.cc/D7LZ-DS7D].
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immigrants from certain countries;122 the lack of commitment to
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals recipients;123 the efforts
to deprive so-called sanctuary cities of federal funding;124 the
recommendations to allow the National Security Agency to conduct
mass surveillance and create a racial profiling database;125 and the
implementation in the spring of 2018 of the “zero tolerance”
policies, which resulted in the mass separation of undocumented
children and their families.126 Furthermore, President Trump has
consistently
exhibited
hostility
towards
undocumented
immigrants in public statements and Tweets.127 With respect to
SIJS, President Trump said that he would like to further limit the
“unaccompanied” status.128 Therefore, SIJS applicants have no
champions in the executive branch.
Likewise, since the 2016 election some Members of
Congress, in both the House of Representatives and the Senate,
have been equally hostile to immigrants, while those in the
legislative branch who support undocumented immigrants have
been unable to effectively challenge the opposition or the president
on immigration issues.129 The distance between Republican and

122 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
123 See Katie Reilly, Here’s What President Trump Has Said About DACA in the
Past, TIME (Sept. 5, 2017), http://time.com/4927100/donald-trump-daca-past-statements/
[https://perma.cc/72DN-FRLY].
124 Ruthie Epstein, Trump and Sessions Keep Trying to Institute AntiImmigrant Policies, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 17, 2017, 4:45 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/trump-and-sessions-keep-trying-instituteanti-immigrant-policies [https://perma.cc/3YAB-VK5M].
125 AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, THE TRUMP MEMOS: THE ACLU’S CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND POLICY PROPOSALS OF DONALD TRUMP 11–14
(2016), https://www.aclu.org/report/trump-memos [https://perma.cc/4HW3-JFE6].
126 See Katie Rogers & Sheryl G. Stolberg, Trump Calls for Depriving
Immigrants Who Illegally Cross Border of Due Process Rights, N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/us/politics/trump-immigration-judges-dueprocess.html [https://perma.cc/2BJ9-FGGL].
127 In June 2018, after signing an executive order aimed at preventing
additional family separations of undocumented children from their parents, President
Trump tweeted those who cross into the United States illegally should be sent back
immediately without due process or an appearance before a judge. See id.; see also Amrit
Cheng, Trump’s Lawyers Say the Muslim Ban Has No Bias, but His Tweets Show
Otherwise, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION: SPEAK FREELY BLOG (Nov. 30, 2017, 3:00 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/trumps-lawyers-say-muslim-ban-has-nobias-his-tweets-show-otherwise [https://perma.cc/GU9G-EY69] (discussing President
Trump’s outward hostility toward Muslim immigrants).
128 See Sarah Gonzalez, What it Means That Trump Wants to Limit
‘Unaccompanied’ Status for Minors Crossing the Borders, WNYC (Mar. 8, 2017),
http://www.wnyc.org/story/unaccompanied-children-face-trump-proposals-immigrationprotections/ [https://perma.cc/HRE3-4TLH].
129 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Thomas Kaplan, Congress Struggles for Path
Forward on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/
16/us/politics/congress-immigration-dreamers.html [https://perma.cc/TW8K-HJTL].

2018]

SIJS IN THE AGE OF TRUMP

99

Democratic positions and their unwillingness to compromise
suggests that Congress will not reform SIJS.130
Thus, in the near term, any relief for SIJS applicants will
not originate from the executive branch or Congress; neither will
act to fix SIJS. Accordingly, SIJS applicants and their advocates
must now look to the courts to compel action.
III.

THE PROPOSAL: A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE

It is clear that the problem of UAC is not going away
anytime soon. Since 2013, a surge of unaccompanied children
have come to the United States escaping poverty, conflict, crime
and violence from their families and home countries;131 their
desperate efforts to cross the border (and sometimes several
borders) represent an ongoing humanitarian crisis.132 Prior to
the passage of SIJS in 1990, states could render the child of
undocumented immigrants a dependent of the state in the face
of parental abandonment, abuse, or neglect; however, the child
could not engage in any activities requiring citizenship or lawful
status, including gainful employment.133 No immigration
mechanism existed that could take the minor’s full situation into
account when determining his or her undocumented status.134
After undergoing removal proceedings, the child would ultimately
have to return to a country he or she often had no real connection
to.135 As discussed in preceding sections, the federal government’s
solution was to create SIJS, a program that could provide these
vulnerable victims a path to legal, permanent residency.136 Unlike
nearly every other immigration law and federal initiative,
however, SIJS granted the states a core “gatekeeping role” in
granting immigration benefits to these children.137 This current
130 See id.; see also Ashley Killough & Tal Kopan, Here Are the Key Players in
Congress on Immigration, CNN (Jan. 11, 2018, 10:08 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2018/
01/11/politics/key-players-immigration-congress/index.html [https://perma.cc/S4B4-B96Z].
131 See supra note 85.
132 “From October of 2016 through February of 2017, Border Patrol
apprehended 27,591 unaccompanied children—an average of nearly [two hundred]
children per day.” Karen Coates, Crossing The Border As an Unaccompanied Child, PAC.
STANDARD (May 24, 2017) https://psmag.com/social-justice/crossing-the-border-as-anunaccompanied-child [https://perma.cc/D52T-PZDN]. Although the total number of
apprehensions in the Southwest border have dropped since President Trump took office,
they nonetheless still remain in the hundreds of thousands. See U.S. Southwest Border
Migration FY 2018, supra note 85. Apprehensions represent a fraction of the total
number of individuals crossing the border.
133 See WASEM, supra note 83, at 2; Keyes, supra note 105, at 45.
134 See WASEM, supra note 83, at 2; see also Lloyd, supra note 84, at 240–41, 241 n.18.
135 Lloyd, supra note 84, at 41.
136 See infra Section II.B.
137 Keyes, supra note 105, at 58.
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SIJS state-federal power-sharing framework is overly complicated;
it is often unpredictable and sometimes broken. Depending on the
state where the applicant seeks predicate findings, some applicants
will be denied all access to SIJS because certain state courts have
created insurmountable legal barriers in order to obtain the
predicate findings.138
It is likewise apparent that the reasonable fixes to SIJS
proposed in legal scholarship will not come to fruition.139 They are
workable and well-taken, but in light of the current executive
branch’s implementation of anti-immigrant policies and the
polarization of Congress, these solutions represent a Sisyphean140
exercise. The only foreseeable path forward is full-throated,
vigorous legal assaults on SIJS in the courts. A Fifth Amendment’s
due process equal protection claim, although novel in this context,
is the appropriate vehicle to transport this challenge.141

138 See Hlass, supra note 105, at 321; see also Keyes, supra note 105, at 43;
Lloyd, supra note 84, at 255, 260–61.
139 See supra Section II.B.3.
140 In Greek mythology Sisyphus was the king of Ephyra. Sisyphus believed
that his cleverness surpassed that of Zeus. As punishment for his self-aggrandizing
actions and beliefs, Zeus required him to push an immense boulder up a steep hill. When
Sisyphus and the boulder neared the top, the boulder would roll back down the hill.
Sisyphus could never complete the task, and thus he was consigned to an eternity of
useless efforts and unending frustration. Sisyphus, GREEKMYTHOLOGY.COM,
https://www.greekmythology.com/Myths/Mortals/Sisyphus/sisyphus.html
[https://perma.cc/VD5Y-PV7Z]; see also Sisyphean, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/180455?redirectedFrom=sisyphean#eid
[https://perma.cc/W99X-4FDD]. Activities that are both laborious and futile have since
come to be characterized as “Sisyphean.” Id.
141 The exact contours of the lawsuit alleging the equal protection challenge
proposed here and the possible remedies are beyond the scope of this article and warrant
further exploration and discussion. Nonetheless, in general, when confronted with a
constitutional flaw in a statute, the courts attempt to limit the solution to the problem.
For example, courts may enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while
leaving other applications in force, see United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20–22 (1960),
or to sever its problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact, see United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–49 (2005).
Consequently, in challenging SIJS in the federal court, possible approaches
might include a request to enjoin the enforcement of the law in those states where
applicants have been denied SIJS findings based on the state overstepping its limited role
and invading the province of the federal government in the SIJS application process. In the
alternative, a plaintiff might argue that the language in section 1101 (a)(27(J)(i), which
authorizes the state courts to make SIJS eligibility findings, violates equal protection.
Rather than nullify the entire SIJS framework, plaintiffs might invite the court to excise
that section from the statute. Under either approach the court could order the DHS to
revise the existing regulations and work with the DOJ to develop a method to continue to
implement SIJS while using exclusively federal decision makers or processes, and thereby
salvage the law and honor the intent of the legislature to provide SIJS.
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The SIJS Legal Framework Deprives Applicants of
Equal Protection

As explained above, the Equal Protection Clause requires
that the government treat individuals equally.142 Equal
protection problems are present in the very DNA of SIJS, which
requires the applicant to apply to the appropriate state court and
obtain certain predicate factual findings based on state law.
After that, the applicant must then apply to DHS, which will
ultimately determine whether to grant SIJS status based on
that state court’s findings.143 By design, SIJS’s bifurcated state
and federal power-sharing arrangement contains blurred
boundaries, and thus contains space for the state courts to
overstep their role—to interpret and possibly misconstrue the
federal law. If (and when) that occurs, the values of equal
protection are offended because the availability of SIJS will then
depend on the state where the predicate findings are sought,
rather than on the merits of the application.
As discussed below, some states have overstepped their
limited role of answering predicate state law matters and
invaded the province of the federal government by interpreting
the SIJS law to determine whether applicants meet the
requirements for SIJS status.144 Two states, specifically
Nebraska and California, are discussed below because they
present clear case studies of state courts surpassing the
authority granted in the SIJS framework to infringe on the
province of the federal government.
1. Nebraska’s Interpretation of Federal Law: A
Requirement that the State Court Find the Child
Cannot Reunify with Both Parents
The SIJS statute requires a state court finding that
“reunification with [one] or both . . . parents is not viable due to
abuse, neglect, abandonment.”145 The Nebraska Supreme Court in
In re Erick M., interpreted the “[one] or both” language in SIJS.146
Erick M. sought SIJS findings during his delinquency proceeding
and argued that although he was planning to reunite with his
mother,147 he was nonetheless eligible for SIJS findings because his
142
143
144
145
146
147

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012).
See infra Sections III.A.1., III.A.2.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012)(emphasis added).
In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Neb. 2012).
Id.
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father had abandoned him.148 The Nebraska delinquency court
refused to issue special findings that would enable Erick M. to
apply for SIJS based on his father’s abandonment because he had
not also shown that he was abused, abandoned, or neglected by his
mother. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed this decision.149
Although the plain language of the SIJS statute permits the state
court to make the requisite findings when the abuse,
abandonment, neglect or other stipulation is by one or both
parents, the state argued that “Erick’s interpretation render[ed the
‘or both’] superfluous,” thus making the statute ambiguous.150
Concluding that one-parent abandonment was insufficient to
establish SIJS eligibility, the Nebraska Supreme Court agreed
with the state and held that “when ruling on a petitioner’s motion
for an eligibility order under § 1101(a)(27)(J) [the SIJS provision in
the Immigration and Nationality Act], a court should generally
consider whether reunification with either parent is feasible” and
that abuse, abandonment, or neglect by both parents was a
requisite for special findings.151
After the Supreme Court of Nebraska decided Erick M.,
family law courts in New York152 and New Jersey153 agreed with
the Nebraska Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “one or both”
language, while California courts soundly rejected it.154 The

148
149
150
151

Id. at 643.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 648 (emphasis added) (citing In re Luis G., 764 N.W.2d 648 (Neb. Ct.

App. 2009)).
152 See, e.g., In the Matter of Fernandez, NN-9132/22, NYLJ 1202584001199, at
1 (Fam. KI, Decided Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202584
001199?slreturn=20141006234750 [https://perma.cc/4SC7-SCWU] (“Emanuel ha[d] only
had one parent, his mother. He cannot be ‘reunified’ with a parent he has never
met. . . . [T]his Court [located in Kings County, New York] concurs with the reasoning In
Erick M., supra, regarding the statutes [sic] use of the word ‘or’ in the phrase
‘reunification with one or both parents.’”). But see, e. g., Diaz v. Munoz, 989 N.Y.S.2d 53,
54 (App. Div. 2014) (Youth in question was eligible for SIJS special findings because of
abandonment by her father, even though the youth “had never met her father”); In re
Karen C., 973 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that a child met the statutory
requirements when her father, but not her mother, had abandoned her); Marcelina M.G. v. Israel S., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 722 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that the plain language
of the statute only requires that one parent abused, abandoned or neglected the child
when both did not); In re Mario S., 954 N.Y.S.2d 843, 852 (Fam. Ct. 2012) (granting
motion for predicate findings where “the father has abandoned the child, and his
reunification with his mother [was] tenuous given her apparent immigration status”).
153 See H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (“We
agree with the holding of the Nebraska court, and overrule the contrary holding.”), rev’d,
121 A.3d 849, 859 (N.J. 2015) (rejecting the lower court’s interpretation of the “[one] or
both” language to require findings as to both parents).
154 See, e.g., Eddie E. v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 779 (Ct. App.
2015) (a literal interpretation of the statute allows SIJS findings when only one parent
abused, abandoned, or neglected the child); see also In re Israel O., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 548,
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concern here is not which construction is the correct
interpretation of federal law. Instead, the problem is that these
state courts are engaged in statutory interpretation of federal
immigration law in the first instance, in addition to the fact that
states are making divergent pronouncements about the federal
law that are conclusive155 and binding on the SIJS applicants
within their respective jurisdictions. This circumstance raises the
possibility that similarly situated SIJS applicants might be
subjected to different interpretations of the federal law (and
therefore different treatment) in other states, which renders the
SIJS framework problematic under the equal protection doctrine.
2. California’s Interpretation of Federal Law: A
Requirement that the State Court Determine that
the Child’s Request for SIJS Findings is “Bona Fide”
The California state courts, like the courts of Nebraska,
have also endeavored to interpret SIJS in a manner that raises
due process equal protection concerns. Specifically, in Bianka M.
v. Superior Court,156 a juvenile filed a parentage action in a
California family court requesting an order “to place her in the
sole legal and physical custody of her mother and to make the
additional findings necessary to allow her to petition for
SIJ[S].”157 The family court declined to make the requested
findings, concluding that Bianka M.’s alleged father was a
necessary party to the proceedings and that the superior court
lacked personal jurisdiction over him.158 Before the California
Court of Appeal, Bianka M. argued that a state court was
required to make SIJS findings at any time upon request.159 The
California Court of Appeal rejected this argument and observed
that “an order containing SIJ findings will not be useful to Bianka
unless it is issued in the context of a bona fide custody
proceeding.”160 The appellate court also found that “[b]ecause
554–56 (Ct. App. 2015) (holding that although the child lived with his mother in the
United States, the statute was satisfied because his father had abandoned him).
155 See, e.g., In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 641 (remains the law in the state
of Nebraska).
156 Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. Reptr. 3d 849, 854 (Cal. Ct. App.
2016), rev’d, 423 P.3d 334 (Cal. 2018).
157 Id. at 853–54.
158 The family court concluded that the juvenile’s request for an award of sole
custody to her mother in a UPA action necessarily required the court to determine
paternity and her father’s parental rights Id. at 854. The custody order “made [the
juvenile’s alleged father] an indispensable party to the parentage action [under the
UPA].” Id. Additionally, the court was also concerned that it did not have personal
jurisdiction over the minor’s father to render any order affecting his parental rights. Id.
159 Id. at 861.
160 Id. at 864.

104

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1

Bianka’s parentage action . . . appears to have been brought only
to obtain SIJ findings, the proceeding below was not a bona fide
custody proceeding under the [Uniform Parentage Act].”161
The Court of Appeal in Bianka M. interpreted SIJS law to
require that superior courts may only make SIJS findings “in the
context of ongoing, bona fide proceedings relating to child welfare,
rather than through specially constructed proceedings designed
mainly for the purpose of issuing orders containing SIJ findings.”162
Federal law, however, imposes no such “bona fide” requirement
during adjudication of state court SIJS petitions. Thus, Bianka M.
effectively invaded the federal government’s authority to regulate
immigration by creating additional predicate findings for
California SIJS applicants that a similarly situated applicant in
another state would not be required to obtain.
The California State Supreme Court subsequently
reversed the intermediate court’s decision in Bianka M.163 In
doing so, however, the California State Supreme Court did not
conclude that the Court of Appeal had overstepped its authority
and invaded the province of the federal government in
interpreting the language of SIJS.164 Instead, the California
Supreme Court grounded its analysis in California state law.165
The failure of the California Supreme Court to even acknowledge
that the intermediate appellate court’s opinion represented a
clear overreach into federal authority to interpret SIJS leaves
open the possibility that California state courts may in the future
continue to exceed their authority with respect to SIJS.
3. Erick M. and Bianka M.: Why the SIJS Bifurcated
State-Federal Structure is Inherently Flawed
Both Erick M. and the intermediate appellate court’s
decision in Bianka M. are emblematic of the problems inherent
in the SIJS bifurcated state-federal structure. First, although
Congress delegated authority to the states to make certain
juvenile court SIJS eligibility findings, the statute does not
delegate authority to interpret the Immigration and Nationality
Act to the states. Second, these cases demonstrate that genuine
Id.
Id. at 860.
163 See Bianka M. v. Superior Court, 423 P.3d 334, 336 (Cal. 2018).
164 Id. at 340–45 n.5 (concluding as a matter of state law that the court of appeal
erred in concluding that Bianka M.’s SIJS petition could not proceed in absence of her
biological father).
165 Id. at 343–46 (finding that under the California Code of Civil Procedure,
section 155, the state court must issue SIJS findings, if factually supported, regardless of
the trial court’s assessment of the child’s motivations in invoking the court’s jurisdiction).
161
162
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disparities will arise among the states that overreach and
interpret federal immigration law, which ultimately leads to
disparate geographic access to SIJS, and, most significantly,
unequal treatment among SIJS applicants based on the fortuity
of where they seek state court SIJS findings.
The structure of SIJS that allows state courts to interpret
the federal law differently leads to unequal treatment of SIJS
applicants and makes SIJS subject to an equal protection
challenge under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
This situation does not present the classic Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause problem in which a state
government discriminates against similarly situated state
residents in a way that offends equal protection.166 Indeed, every
SIJS applicant in Nebraska who is similarly situated to Erick M.
will be treated the same by the Nebraska courts. For our
purposes, the relevant comparison is between a SIJS applicant,
as in the case of Erick M., who lived in Nebraska and could be
reunited with only one parent, but is denied SIJS findings based
on the state of Nebraska’s interpretation of SIJS, and a similarly
situated SIJS applicant who lives in another state that has
deferred interpretation to the federal government and are thus
found to be SIJS eligible in a state court. This is not a problem that
can be effectively attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.167 Instead, the equal protection problem here
arises because of the federal government’s actions.
DHS has no authority under SIJS to grant a SIJS
application if the applicant does not obtain the requisite state
court predicate findings.168 Specifically, in those states where the
state court has interpreted the federal law in a way that denies
access to SIJS, then the predicate findings will not be obtained.
DHS has no legal authority to review a state court’s refusal to
issue SIJS findings, even in situations (such as in Erick M. and
Bianka M.) where the denial is based on the state’s
interpretation of federal law.169 Thus, DHS will be required as a
See supra note 64.
See supra text accompanying note 33. Given that the analysis is similar in
terms of the outcome it should not matter whether action is held to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment due process provision.
168 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012).
169 See Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, U.S.
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., to Reg’l Dirs. & Dist. Dirs. (May 27, 2004), https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-2008/
2004/sij_memo_052704.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CL9-6RCA]; Memorandum from Lori Scialabba,
Deputy Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., to January Contrera, Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs. Ombudsman (July 13, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Citizenship-andImmigration-Services-Ombudsman-Recommendation-Special-Immigrant-JuvenileAdjudications.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK9C-UGRS].
166
167
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matter of law to reject the SIJS application out of hand, even
though had that same applicant resided in a different state the
application would have been granted. Thus, because of the
structure of SIJS, the DHS will treat similarly situated SIJS
applicants from different states unequally.
In enacting SIJS, Congress chose to extend its privileges
to every applicant who was eligible, and having done so, the
federal government cannot deny those privileges based on the
fortuity of where the applicant applied. When Congress acts, as
it did when it enacted the SIJS legal framework, the
Constitution requires that the law comports with Fifth
Amendment principles of equal protection and due process. SIJS
does not satisfy those principles.
B.

Why the Equal Protection Challenge Should Succeed

As discussed elsewhere here,170 Plyler introduced the idea
that undocumented children are particularly vulnerable and thus
the laws that discriminate against them are subject to some level
of judicial scrutiny higher than rational basis; the court required
that the government show that the discrimination satisfied a
“substantial” state goal.171 Thus, notwithstanding the deference
otherwise granted to the executive and congressional branches in
the area of immigration,172 deference to Congress and the
executive does not insulate discriminatory immigration laws from
the judicial scrutiny under equal protection principles.
Furthermore, although this article proposes a novel and
unique application of the equal protection doctrine, no
meritorious counterargument exists that might undermine the
equal protection challenge presented here. The equal protection
injury at issue—that SIJS’s framework lacks uniform legal
guidance, allowing states to interpret federal law inconsistently,
which ultimately causes the federal government to apply SIJS
See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
172 In deference to the plenary power in the area of immigration to the other
branches of the federal government, courts typically apply rational basis review to
discriminatory immigration laws that, if enacted by a state, would trigger strict scrutiny.
See, e.g., Halaim v. INS, 358 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause federal authority
in the areas of immigration and naturalization is plenary, ‘[f]ederal classifications
distinguishing among groups of aliens . . . are valid unless wholly irrational.’”) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1464 (9th Cir. 1985);
see also Lawrence v. Holder, 717 F.3d 1036, 1041 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013) (addressing a “halfhearted” equal protection argument, the court noted that Congress can “draw lines that
specify effective dates when it enacts or amends relief statutes.”); Hernandez-Mezquita v.
Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1161, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2002) (filing deadline for NACARA relief did not
violate equal protection); Perez-Oropeza v. INS, 56 F.3d 43, 45–46 (9th Cir. 1995) (limited
eligibility for family unity waiver did not violate equal protection).
170
171
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unequally—is harm unlike those that the federal courts
traditionally countenance. Indeed, there are some instances
where the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have
tolerated variation in statutory and constitutional interpretations
of the law among the courts.173 This resembles none of them.
For example, “[n]o court has ever held that the mere
existence of a circuit split on an issue of statutory interpretation
violates due process or equal protection.”174 Courts recognize that
disagreements among the federal circuit courts often lead to a
review by the Supreme Court,175 and thus circuit splits are
tolerated in part because they are temporary.176 At least in the
case of criminal defendants, circuits splits are accepted as a
rational consequence of their conviction.177 In contrast, the SIJS
cases involve minors, not criminal defendants. Moreover, the
problem with the interpretation of SIJS does not involve differing
interpretations and applications of the law among federal
circuits—it involves a split among the states’ interpretation of
federal law. As the Erick M. case demonstrates, the situation is
not temporary. Erick M. is the law in Nebraska and all similarly
situated SIJS applicants in Nebraska are bound by it.178
In addition, this problem does not involve the
interpretation or application of federal regulations. When
reviewing challenges to administrative agencies’ interpretations
of laws they implement, the federal courts defer under Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council to the agencies
unless their interpretation violates “the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”179
Likewise, this is not a situation where variation in the
interpretation of the law should be tolerated because a state is
simply interpreting state law. In general, the federal courts
defer to the interpretation of state law by the state’s highest
court on matters of state law.180
See infra text accompanying note 175.
Habibi v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting contention
that the differing application of the law in different circuits violates equal protection).
175 See, e.g., Graham v. United States, No. CV-91-4112, 1992 WL 141998, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. June 4, 1992) (“The Supreme Court commonly grants certiorari to heal circuit splits.”).
176 Id. at *9; see also Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster Cty., 488 U.S.
336, 343 (1989) (inequalities between tax rates would not violate equal protection if they
were temporary, since “the constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a
rough equality”).
177 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Gilkey, 242 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (observing
that a criminal defendant’s equal protection rights are not violated on the ground that
“similarly situated” defendants are treated differently as a result of a circuit split).
178 In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 648 (Neb. 2012).
179 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
180 See e.g., Cent. Union Tel. Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 195 (1925)
(upholding Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of a state waiver rule, even though
173
174
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The deference afforded to state courts to interpret state
law has been recognized even in the context of SIJS. In 2008, in
Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez, a class of SIJS applicants challenged,
inter alia, the “age-out” regulations in SIJS law.181 They argued
that the regulations violated the Equal Protection Clause
because in some states the process of obtaining SIJS state court
predicate findings took so long that by the time applicants
received those findings they were no longer eligible under state
law, i.e., they had aged out of the state dependency system, and
thus could no longer receive SIJS predicate findings from the
state.182 The district court rejected all of the plaintiffs’ arguments
challenging the “age-out” regulations, afforded the regulations
deference under Chevron, and concluded that the SIJS
regulations were uniform and rational.183 With respect to the
equal protection claim, the court dispatched in a footnote that
the problem for the SIJS applicants was not that the federal
government had engaged in differential treatment in the
application of the federal regulations, or that the states had
interpreted the federal regulations in a manner that failed to
comply with the federal law.184 Instead, the plaintiffs’ complaint
centered on the state’s interpretation and application of the
state’s dependency law, which the court implicitly concluded did

that interpretation resulted in the forfeiture of federal constitutional rights; refusing to
supplant Illinois law with a federal definition of waiver, the Supreme Court explained
that the state court’s declaration “should bind us unless so unfair or unreasonable in its
application to those asserting a federal right as to obstruct it.”).
181 Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez, 248 F.R.D. 248, 252 (C.D. Cal. 2008). In PerezOlano, the plaintiffs’ primary challenge to the “age-out” regulations was that they
“impose[d] additional eligibility requirements unauthorized by the statute.” Id. at 268–
69. They also challenged the government’s policy requiring in-custody minors to obtain
ICE’s specific consent, contending that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) did not authorize the
defendants to acquire specific consent for a SIJS-predicate order because such orders do
not “determine the custody status or placement” of an in-custody minor. Id. at 263–67.
As they existed when Perez-Olano was decided,
8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1) preclude[d] SIJ classification once a youth [was] no
longer “under twenty-one years of age.” [The regulation] require[d] that a
youth seeking SIJ status “continue to be dependent upon the juvenile court
and eligible for long-term foster care, such declaration, dependency or
eligibility not having been vacated, terminated, or otherwise ended . . . .”
Similarly, for SIJ-based adjustment of status, 8 C.F.R. §§ 205.1(a)(3)(iv)(A, C,
& D) revoke[d] a youth’s SIJ classification “[u]pon the beneficiary reaching the
age of 21; . . . the termination of the beneficiary’s dependency upon the juvenile
court; . . . [or] the termination of the [youth’s] eligibility for long-term foster
care.”
Id. at 267.
182
183
184

Id. at 269 n.14.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 269 n.14.
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not represent a violation of equal protection guarantees.185 In
contrast, here, the equal protection problem originates from
states’ differing interpretations of federal law, which was not an
issue in Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez.
Finally, the problem presented in this article does not fall
within the narrow category of criminal cases, notably in the
federal habeas context, where the federal courts often defer to
the state court application of federal law.186 The deference to the
state courts’ interpretations in the criminal habeas context is by
design; it stems from the large role the state courts play in the
criminal justice system compared to the more limited role of
federal courts.187 Nonetheless, although the federal courts defer
to the state courts in the context of habeas, even that deference
has its limits—the federal court will grant relief where the state
court’s action violates constitutional rights.188 And that is exactly
the situation presented here—the state courts interpreting SIJS
in a way that results in a violation of the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection. Indeed, SIJS was intended to
serve a fair, uniform, and unitary nationwide process for UAC to
seek protected status under federal immigration law. The states
were not invited into the process to place their own unique spin
185 Id. Perez-Olano was settled in 2010 and the settlement updated again in
2015. As part of the settlement, the class members who had been deprived of SIJS
findings based on the age-out provision were eligible to reopen their SIJS cases with the
DHS. See Settlement Agreement at 8, Perez-Olano v. Holder, 2:05-cv-03604-DDP-RZ
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010) (No. 2:05-CV-3604), ECF. No. 159-1; see also William
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110457, § 235, 122 Stat 5044, 5074–82 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012);
Stipulation Settling Motion for Class Wide Enforcement of Settlement at 2–6, PerezOlano v. Holder, 2:05-cv-03504-DDP-RZ (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (No. 2:05-CV-3604), ECF
No. 186, http://immigrantchildren.org/PDF/186%2003-04-15%20Perez%20Olano%20%20STIPULATION%20SETTLING%20MOTION%20FOR%20CLASS-%20WIDE%20
ENFORCEMENT%20OF%20SETTLEMENT.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H4C-BPDT].
186 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976) (Recognizing that “there is ‘no
intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to [federal law] than his neighbor in
the state courthouse’”) (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963)).
187 Habeas relief will be granted if the petitioner demonstrates that the state
court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). This “‘highly deferential standard’”
is “‘difficult to meet,’ because the purpose . . . is to ensure that federal habeas relief
functions as a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’
‘and not as a means of error correction.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180 (2011)
(citation omitted); Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011)). “The Court is not to determine whether the court of appeals’s
decision was correct or whether this Court may have reached a different outcome.” Larson
v. Patterson, No. 2:09-CV-989-PMW, 2011 WL 129485, at *1 (D. Utah Jan. 14, 2011) (citing
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003)). “The role of federal habeas proceedings,
while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and
limited.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
188 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003).
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on the federal law; rather, when originally enacted, the states
were included in the framework simply because the drafters
believed that state courts had the family law expertise and
experience needed to make the predicate factual findings
relevant to the eligibility determination.189 As has been shown,
however, in cases such as Erick M. and Bianka M., the state
courts have overstepped that authority. Thus, SIJS applicants,
similar to Erick M.190, have no recourse except to assert a federal
equal protection claim because their highest state court has
interpreted the federal law in a way that is unfair and forecloses
their access to the federal privileges of SIJS.191
Admittedly, this novel proposal—asserting an equal
protection challenge—to achieve reform of an entire framework of
federal law and the arguments offered in support of this idea is
without precedent in the context of SIJS. It is not, however,
entirely without analogical support in the canon of Supreme
Court jurisprudence. A useful comparison can be drawn between
the equal protection harms here and those that the Supreme
Court found in Bush v. Gore.192 The majority in Bush v. Gore
identified the Florida Supreme Court’s failure to formulate
uniform rules and specific standards for the counties to use to
determine voter intent as the reason the state court’s recount
procedures violated the Equal Protection Clause.193 The Florida
Supreme Court had baked in uncertainty and ambiguity in the
vote counting process, allowing counties in Florida to apply their
individual legal standards, leading, according to the majority of
the Supreme Court, to the unequal evaluation of the ballots across
the state.194 SIJS suffers from the same failings. SIJS’ bifurcated,
state-federal power-sharing framework, as well the language of
SIJS, have given the states too much space to interpret the SIJS
law and to create legal standards based on state interpretation of
See supra note 87.
In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 639 (Neb. 2012).
191 This point is clearly illustrated in the case of Nebraska after Erick M. In
2014, two years after the Nebraska Supreme Court decided Erick M., USCIS, the agency
charged with administering the Act, including applications for SIJS, took the position
that abuse, neglect or abandonment by one parent was sufficient for purposes of SIJS
predicate findings. See Immigration Relief for Abused Children, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS. at 1 (Apr. 2014), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/
Green%20Card/Green%20Card%20Through%20a%20Job/Immigration_Relief_for_Ab
used_Children-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YPB-2UUH] (providing that SIJ-eligible
children may “[b]e living with a foster family, an appointed guardian, or the non-abusive
parent”). This notwithstanding, the Nebraska Supreme court’s interpretation of the “one
or both” parent language—now at odds with the USCIS view—remains the law for SIJS
applicants in Nebraska.
192 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000).
193 Id. at 105–08.
194 Id. at 106.
189
190
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federal law, ultimately leading to the unequal application of
federal law. There is no conceivable rational basis to justify the
unequal treatment of SIJS applicants; there is no interest,
substantial or otherwise, that it serves. Following Bush v. Gore,
therefore, SIJS violates equal protection.
IV.

IF NOT BEFORE, WHY NOW?

Interestingly, none of the immigration scholars researching
and writing passionately about SIJS’ failings and potential fixes
have suggested an equal protection challenge to it. Legal research
has revealed that among the numerous legal attacks on SIJS
mounted since its enactment almost thirty years ago, an equal
protection challenge has been asserted only once in Perez-Olano v.
Gonzalez, which claimed that SIJS’s “age-out” provision violated
the equal protection doctrine only as an adjunct and alternative
argument to its primary attack on the regulation.195
Why is that the case? If, as this article posits, an equal
protection problem is ingrained in SIJS, and the entire framework
of the law is susceptible to a successful equal protection challenge,
why has the claim not been proposed in the scholarship or
litigated before now?
Maybe it has not been asserted because the question
presented is too complicated, i.e., does a violation of the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law result when a
state actor interprets the federal law in a way that causes a
federal actor to apportion federal benefits unequally? This is a
difficult question to pose, let alone answer. Or maybe the
challenge has escaped attention for prudential reasons, such as
when the identity of the defendants is not clear. Alternatively, it
could be that scholars and advocates that are usually focused on
the intricacies of immigration law (rather than constitutional law)
have simply not considered asserting an equal protection claim.
On the other hand, it is also possible that immigration law
advocates have previously considered equal protection claims but
decided against asserting them because of the risk associated
with attacking the entire SIJS framework. They may fear that the
courts might invalidate the law in its entirety—“throw the baby
out with the bath water”196—leaving all unaccompanied,
195 See Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez, 248 F.R.D. 248, 262–69 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see
also supra note 181 and accompanying text.
196 This idiom derives from a German proverb, “das Kind mit dem Bade
ausschütten.” This phrase first appeared in 1512, in Narrenbeschwörung (Appeal to
Fools) by Thomas Murner. Michael Quinion, Newsletter 826, WORLD WIDE WORDS (Apr.
6, 2013), http://www.worldwidewords.org/nl/ohfq.htm [https://perma.cc/WDG5-8GPW].
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undocumented children with no opportunity to remain in the
United States legally.197 This fear is genuine. Nonetheless, given
the anti-immigrant political sentiments expressed during the
2016 election cycle, the Trump administration’s attempts to end
DACA, its “zero tolerance” immigration policy, the open hostility
expressed by members of the executive branch towards the
undocumented community, and the lack of political will and
inaction in Congress, non-litigation options are not viable.198 In
addition, given the climate of deregulation that currently prevails
in federal agencies,199 the SIJS as we have known it for more than
twenty-five years may soon no longer exist. Consequently, there
is nothing left to lose by asserting an equal protection challenge
to the SIJS framework.
Challenges to federal government actions based on the
Equal Protection Clause are increasing.200 They are the new
black.201 In the last eighteen months, equal protection challenges
have been filed to enjoin a number of the executive branch’s
actions and the federal courts have not hesitated to review the
merits of these cases.202 The moment for an equal protection
challenge to SIJS has arrived. No time like the present.
197 Given the recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, this fear is not
entirely unjustified. See e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1701 (2017).
In Morales-Santana, the Supreme Court held the different treatment of unmarried
fathers and unmarried mothers in, 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2012), with regard to the required
length of physical presence, was an equal-protection violation. Id. at 1696–1701. The
Court, however, disagreed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
on the appropriate remedy for this violation. Rather than choosing to extend the benefits
of § 1409(c) to Mr. Morales-Santana and others disadvantaged by the equal-protection
violation, the Court held that withdrawing the benefits of § 1409(c) from those to whom
it applied was more consistent with Congressional intent, because § 1409(c) was merely
an exception to the broader and stricter rule of 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7). Id. at 1699. “Going
forward,” the Court said, “Congress may address the issue and settle on a uniform
prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender.”
Id. at 1701. Until Congress does so, however, the Court held that “[i]n the
interim . . . § 1401(a)(7)’s now-five-year requirement should apply, prospectively, to
children born to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers.” Id. This notwithstanding, as described
supra note 141, here plaintiffs might request an injunction prohibiting unconstitutional
applications or a holding that consistency with legislative intent requires invalidating a
section of the law that offends equal protection and in so doing seek a narrow remedy
with preserves the entitlement intended by the legislature in promulgating SIJS.
198 See supra Section II.B.3.b.
199 Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era, B ROOKINGS I NST . (Oct. 20,
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-the-trumpera/ [https://perma.cc/J588-J5HN].
200 See supra notes 4–11.
201 Because “black” is always in style in the fashion industry, proclaiming that
something is “the new black” means that it is the hottest new thing. This phrase is no
longer limited to the world of fashion; it highlights the “coolness” of anything. The New
Black, FARLEX DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS (2015), https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/the+
new+black [https://perma.cc/9KQQ-6XGV].
202 Indeed, the litigation of President Trump’s travel ban provides an example
where the courts have shown a willingness to decide the outer limits of discrimination
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CONCLUSION
The values embodied in the equal protection doctrine—
that similarly situated people will be accorded equal treatment
under the law—are central to American democracy. Likewise, and
undeniably, the United States has always been a nation of
immigrants—they have been given equal protection under the
law and fair access to the privileges to which they are entitled.
These ideals, however, are under siege. The current executive and
legislative branches are not only ineffective in safeguarding the
equal protection rights of immigrants but are also leading the
attacks on them. Consequently, as discussed in the SIJS example,
when equal protection concerns arise based on states’ inconsistent
interpretations and application of the federal laws, in conjunction
with the hostility from the executive and legislative branches,
resorting to the courts is the only viable option to vindicate those
rights. Although the problems in the SIJS framework are inborn,
existing since the law’s enactment, given the tremendous increase
in immigration of unaccompanied immigrant minors to the
United States in the last five years, it is crunch time for
addressing the problems in SIJS. Since 2016, the federal courts
have shown a greater willingness to consider equal protection
challenges to government action. Thus, an equal protection
challenge to SIJS is viable and ripe. It is time to strike while the
iron is hot—the Trump era demands nothing less.

in the name of national security. The Ninth Circuit confirmed that “evidence of purpose
beyond the face of the challenged law may be considered in evaluating Establishment
and Equal Protection Clause claims.” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167–68
(9th Cir. 2017) (finding that President Trump’s statements regarding a “Muslim ban”
raised “serious allegations and presented significant constitutional questions,” although
it ultimately reserved consideration of plaintiffs’ equal protection claim).

